A game on a convex geometry is a real-valued function de®ned on the family L of the closed sets of a closure operator which satis®es the ®nite Minkowski±Krein±Milman property. If L is the Boolean algebra 2 N then we obtain a n-person cooperative game. We will introduce convex and quasi-convex games on convex geometries and we will study some properties of the core and the Weber set of these games. Ó
Introduction
A cooperative game is a function v that assigns to each coalition S N of a ®nite set N of players a real number vS with vY 0. Assuming that the coalition N of all players will form, a solution concept will prescribe a distribution of the worth vN among the players. Doubtless, the most attractive solution concept is the core of the game. The core of a game v : 2 N 3 R; is the set of the vectors x P R n with iPN x i vN and iPS x i P vS, for all the coalitions S P 2 N . Notice that no coalition S N should be able to improve upon x.
In this paper, we develop a model of cooperative games in which only certain coalitions are allowed to form. We will study the structure of such allowable coalitions using the theory of convex geometries, a notion developed to combinatorially abstract geometric convexity. In this context, the core is de®ned for the previous relations, but only for feasible coalitions. There have been previous models developed for Myerson [11] , Faigle [5] and Faigle and Kern [6, 7] .
We begin by de®ning a convex geometry and describing some of their fundamental properties. Section 3 will de®ne what we mean by the core for a game on a convex geometry. In Section 4 we introduce the Weber set as the convex hull of the marginal worth vectors. In the classical situation, a game is convex if and only if the Weber set coincides with the core of the game. For a game v on a convex geometry L 2 N , the inclusion Core L; v Weber L; v is not true. However, in the last section we show that for games on convex geometries the Weber set is contained in the core if and only if the game is quasi-convex. If the game is monotone then the result also holds for convex games. 
Games on convex geometries
In this section, we de®ne the concept of convex geometry [4] and describe its fundamental properties. Let N f1; 2; . . . ; ng be a ®nite set and consider a family L of subsets of N with the
The family L gives rise to the operator ± : 2 N 3 2 N de®ned by
The operator ± has the following properties: A A, A A and A B implies A B, for all A; B N with the additional condition that Y Y.
That is, the operator ± is a closure operator and N ; À is a closure space [1] . Conversely, every operator with the above conditions de®nes a family L 2 N with properties (1) and (2) as the family of its closed sets L :
N , ordered by inclusion, is a complete lattice in which meet and join operations are de®ned by
A B A B; A B A B;
for all A; B P L:
Throughout the remainder of this paper the closure space N ; À with the family L of its closed sets is identi®ed. De®nition 1. The family of the closed sets L is a convex geometry if it satis®es the anti-exchange property:
For every A N ; if i; j T P A and j P A i
A set in a convex geometry L is called convex. For A N an element a P A is an extreme point of A if a T P A n a. For a closed set A P L this is equivalent to A n a P L. Let exA be the set of all extreme points of A. The convex geometries are the abstract closure spaces satisfying the ®nite Minkowski±Krein±Milman property: Every closed set is the closure of its extreme points [4] . The following result shows that convex geometries have some properties of Euclidean convexity. Theorem 1. Let ± : 2 N 3 2 N be a closure operator on N and let L be the family of its closed sets. Then the following statements are equivalent:
(a) L is a convex geometry. The coalitions are the convex sets of L and the players are the elements i P N . Let CL be the vector space over R of all games on the convex geometry L 2 N . A game on a convex geometry is called monotone or convex when v : L 3 R satis®es the corresponding property for the partial order and the join and meet operations.
Example 1.
A communication situation is a triple N ; G; v, where N ; v is a game and G N ; E is a graph. This concept was ®rst introduced in Myerson [11] , and investigated in Borm et al. [3] . If G N ; E is a connected block-graph ( [9] , p. 30), then the family of all coalitions of N that induce connected subgraphs
is a convex geometry ( [4] , Theorem 3.7).
Example 2. A subset S of a partially ordered set (poset) P ; T is convex whenever a P S; b P S and a T b imply a; b S. The convex subsets of any poset P form a closure system CoP . If P (or, equivalently CoP ) is ®nite, then each element is between a maximal and a minimal one. If C P CoP then exC is the union of the maximal and minimal elements of C. Moreover, CoP is a convex geometry ( [2] , Theorem 3).
Example 3. Let P ; T be a poset. For any X P , X U 3 X : y P P : y f T x for some x P X g de®nes a closure operator on P. Its closed sets are the order ideals (down sets) of P and we denote this lattice J P . Since the union and intersection of order ideals is again an order ideal, it follows that J P is a sublattice of 2 P . Then J P is a distributive lattice and so, J P is a convex geometry closed under set-union and exS is the set of all maximal points Max(S) of the subposet S P J P . When P is ®nite, there is a 1±1 correspondence between antichains of P and order ideals. Then the games C; v and A; c of Faigle and Kern, where C is the family of down sets of P [6] and A is the set of antichains of a hierarchy [7] , are games on distributive lattices.
The core of games on convex geometries
In the ®rst part of this section we give some standard results of polyhedrons (see [13] ). A set P R n is called a polyhedron if there exists a matrix A and a column vector b such that P x P R n : Ax T b f g . A set P R n is called a polytope if there exist x 1 ; . . . ; x t P R n such that P conv x 1 ; . . . ; x t f g . A set P R n is a polytope if and only if P is a bounded polyhedron ( [13] , p. 89). The polyhedron P is bounded if and only if
, p. 100). A vertex of P is an element of P which is not a convex combination of two other elements of P. If the polyhedron P has at least one vertex, then P is called pointed. The polyhedron P is pointed if and only if x P R n : Ax 0 f g 0 f g. Now, we de®ne the core of games with restricted cooperation.
De®nition 3. Let v P CL. The core of the game v is the set
xS P vS for all S P Lg;
where for any S P L; xS iPS x i , and xY 0.
The following characterization for games on set systems with a non empty core is shown by Faigle [5] . The indicator function 1 S : N 3 f0; 1g for the subset S N is given by
T Y if and only if for all S 1 ; . . . ; S n P L n fYg and m P N;
Proof. See Theorem 4 of Faigle [5] . h
The duality theorem of linear programming ( [13] , p. 90) implies the following result. Proof. For all i P N , we know that i P ex i f g.
Theorem 4. Let v be a game on a convex geometry L 2 N such that Core L; v is non-empty and vS P 0. Then, the following statements are equivalent:
(a) The core of the game v is a polytope.
Let k P j f g with k T j; and we de®ne the vector x P R n ,
This vector x T 0 satis®es x N 0, and x S P 0; for all S P L, because if j P S then j f g S, hence k P S. This is a contradiction with statement (a). 
, where the Weber set is the convex hull of the marginal worth vectors for v [12] . In 1978, Weber (see [14] ) has shown that any game satis®es Core v Weber v . Ichiishi [10] proved that if Weber v Core v then v is a convex game. Thus, these results imply the following characterization of convex games:
v: 2 N 3 R; is a convex game if and only if Core v
Weber v :
We study these concepts for games on convex geometries. Edelman and Jamison de®ned a compatible ordering of a convex geometry L 2 N as a total ordering of the elements of N, i 1 < i 2 < Á Á Á < i n such that the set
A compatible ordering of L corresponds exactly to a maximal chain in L. We denote by C L the set of all the maximal chains of L. Given i P N ; and a maximal chain C, let Ci : fj P N : j T i in the chain Cg:
De®nition 5. Let v P CL and C P CL. The marginal worth vector a C P R n with respect to the chain C in the game v is given by
; for all i P N :
The ith coordinate a C i represents the marginal contribution of player i to the coalition of his predecessors with respect to the chain C. Proof. Let v P CL and C P CL. We denote by S k the coalition of C such that jS k j k for any k P N . Put S 0 Y and S k i 1 ; i 2 ; . . . ; i k f gfor all 1 T k T n. By de®nition, we have that a We obtain the relation between the core and the Weber set of a game on a convex geometry. If L is the Boolean algebra 2 N and v is an n-person cooperative game, then the core of v is contained in the Weber set. This result is due to Weber [14] . However, the inclusion CoreL; v WeberL; v does not hold when v is a game on a convex geometry L T 2 N . In the following examples, we will use the convex geometry Co3 2 N , where N 1; 2; 3 f g and Co3 Y; 1 f g; 2 f g; 3 f g; 1; 2 f g; 2; 3 f g; f 1; 2; 3 f gg, is the collection of the convex subsets of the poset 3 f1 < 3g. There are four maximal chains in L
The Hasse diagram of the lattice Co (3) On the other hand, the core of v is Now, we get that the core is the set
x 1 T 3g conv 0; 1; 2 ; 1; 0; 2 ; 3; 0; 0 ; f 0; 3; 0g:
In this example, each marginal worth vector coincides with some vertex of the core and hence Weber L; v Core L; v . The following proposition provides a special type of vertices of the core.
Proof. By Proposition 2, we have for all S P C. Since each maximal chain in L has n non-empty coalitions, we get n equations and due to their linear independence, we can conclude that a C is a vertex of the polyhedron Core L; v . h
Convex and quasi-convex games
Faigle and Kern [7] introduced the concept of a convex game for a distributive lattice A; ;
. In our model, a convex geometry L is a lattice with the join and meet operations S T S T ; S T S T for all S; T P L:
is said to be convex or supermodular if for all S; T P L,
We introduce the concept of a quasi-convex game for studying the core of the game.
It is obvious that convex implies quasi-convex.
Remark 1. Note that if there is only a maximal chain in L, all games de®ned on L are convex.
Proposition 4. A game v P C L is quasi-convex if and only if for all S; T P L such that T & S and for all i P ex S T , we have
Proof. Let S; T P L such that T & S and let i P ex S T . Consider S H S n i and T H T . We have
Applying the de®nition of quasi-convexity to S H and T H , it follows that
Conversely, let S; T P L such that S T P L. If T & S or S & T , then the equality is clear. Consider S T T S and S T T T and let C P C L be a maximal chain such that S T ; T ; S T P C. As S n T T Y, put jS n T j k and write S n T i 1 ; i 2 ; . . .
, the chain C is given by
Let R S T and denote S j i 1 ; i 2 ; . . . ; i j È É for all 1 T j T k with S 0 Y. Then we have that for all 1 T j T k; T S j P L and
Now, considering the hypothesis, we get
since R S j & T S j and
and now it follows that
Proof. A Let C be a maximal chain in L. Proposition 2 implies that jPS a C j v S for all S P C. It remains to prove that jPS a C j P v S for all S T P C. Let S P L such that S T P C and put jSj s P 1. Write S i 1; i 2; . . . ; i s f g , where
Denote by S j i 1; i 2; . . . ; i j È É for all 1 T j T s and S 0 Y. For all 1 T j T s, we have S j S Ci j P L and also i j P exCi j . Proposition 4 implies that for all 1 T j T s, we have
and hence
be a maximal chain containing S T and S T . The marginal worth vector a C P R n , belongs to Core L; v , hence a C S P vS and a C T P vT . By construction, a C S T vS T and a C S T vS T . Therefore,
Proof. It is a direct consequence of theorem since the core of a game v P C L is a convex set. h This game is quasi-convex but it is not convex since for S 1 f g and T 3 f g; we have S T Y; S T f1; 3g N and
The marginal worth vectors for v are:
and hence Weber L; v Core L; v 1; f À 1; 1g:
In the above example, we obtain that the core and the Weber set are equals, for a non convex game. Then, the property Weber L; v Core L; v is not a characterization of the convex games on convex geometries. Proof. If v is convex then it is quasi-convex and corollary 1 of Theorem 5 implies the property. Conversely, for S; T P L, let C be a maximal chain containing to S T S T and S T S T . We observe that a C S P v S and a C T P v T , since the marginal worth vector a C P Core L; v . On the other hand, a 
